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The Absurdity of Property in the Person
Jane M. Gaines*
I had some reticence about doing a talk about legal culture because
my work had moved so far away from it in recent years. In the
process of rethinking a book that was published in 1991,1 however,
I was surprised to discover some carry-over issues, as most scholars
must find when they undertake this exercise. But my new area of
interest seemed to be so far afield from the earlier one. In 1991, I had
been working on the most banal objects of consumer culture-t-shirts
and key rings-and now I was working on the legacies of slave culture
in the representation of blacks in early United States cinema. The
thread, I think, has to do with a fascination with the way things that
are originally unpropertylike become property. Corollary to this is the
probability that human beings, when defined as property, will defy
attempts to turn them into things, will chafe against all of the
constraints that this entails-from the transfer of ownership to bodily
violations. It is a stretch to go from the absolutely crass and ap-
parently inconsequential topic of licensed character merchandise to
the unquestionably serious history of human enslavement and
liberation. The connections may not be immediately obvious,
particularly given the unfettered trade and accelerated expansion of
the entertainment industry and all of its adjacent and subsidiary
industries, including advertising and merchandising. The surface
distinction concerns me less than the shared legal and philosophical
underpinnings-the assumptions about property that literally hold
these high-flying and wild-riding industries together and the way
litigation threatens to make parts of them come unglued at the same
time that it glues them back together pretty much as they were.
When it comes to entertainment law, I really am an iconoclast: My
interest in legal culture has been motivated by an interest quite
unlike-indeed significantly unlike-the interests of the legal profes-
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1. JANE GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991).
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sion. What attracted me to the doctrines of entertainment law was
something that struck me as nonsensical in the case law, something
that, on closer examination, I had been working on already for several
years in my life as a film scholar. Certainly, I had found humor in
some of the cases that I studied in my book, Contested Culture: The
Image, the Voice, and the Law.2 For instance, what originally
fascinated me about the "Dracula" case, in which Bela Lugosi's
relatives tried to enjoin Universal Films from using his image on
posters, key chains, and cocktail stirring rods,3 was the idea that
Lugosi could return from the dead to claim his rights. The legal
question presented was: Did Lugosi's privacy rights survive him?4 If
they did, Lugosi would, in effect, return from the dead to reestablish
his claim to his image, thereby warding off Universal Pictures, his
former employer, like a charm. A similarly absurd issue arose when
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis's lawyers argued that the look-alike hired
by an advertising agency to appear in an ad for Christian Dior clothes
invaded Onassis's "right of privacy." Did Jackie Onassis have the
right to enjoin the body of a woman who looked like her merely
because she looked like her?5 My interest in "look-alikeness," as well
as "sound-alikeness" in the case of Nancy Sinatra's voice,6 was in part
an attempt to consider similarity in a philosophical way-to look at
the ramifications of the assumptions that not only underlie entertain-
ment law but also provide a foundation for copyright law. Whereas
the general public may think that copyright law is all about similarity,
it is, as we know, actually all about and only about copying. Yet these
questions of similarity and the right to copy, even the problem of the
posthumous privacy right, are only surface questions, surface
indicators. In retrospect, I think, in writing a book about the conse-
quence of the seemingly inconsequential object of entertainment law,
I was really trying to probe something else, and I will get to that
something else below.
The promise, or, one might say, the allure of cultural studies for me
has always been the possibility of reading the whole of the culture in
the smallest of its parts. From the first time I read Roland Barthes's
Mythologies, one of the foundational texts of cultural studies, I was
intrigued by the idea that one could take the political temperature of
the most banal of objects-for Barthes, it was steak and chips, the
2. Id.
3. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), vacated, 603
P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
4. See id. at 36.
5. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
6. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
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wrestling match, and the face of Garbo.7 The goal was to get the
cultural artifact to relinquish its political secret-to wrestle with it
until it could be made to give up that secret. It was not, however, that
each object contained a different secret. And here I have to say that
the secret that was withheld by each discrete object was always the
same-the appeal of cultural studies at its inception, really, was that
its analytical powers were such that every object of consumer culture
could be made to tell us that it was the product of capitalism. It could
even tell us, in a microcosm, how capitalism worked. Frustrated after
years of trying to make works of literary and cinematic fiction say
something profound about the culture from which they grew, actually
to say something political, when these works were often so stubbornly
resistant, I turned to reading case law.
Reading entertainment law was an epiphany. There I found the
history of U.S. consumer culture laid out before me-from turn-of-
the-century photography to serial television. But instead of popular
culture's ubiquity and familiarity, I found unfamiliar mechanisms:
Case law, I found, reveals the machinery that produces familiarity and
popularity, the machinery that produces the seal of ownership and the
promise of profit, and that guarantees the circulation of photographs
and sound recordings. I thus decided to frame Contested Culture with
the 1884 case involving copyright in the photograph of Oscar Wilde'
and to end with the many trials of DC Comics in its attempt to
control the Superman character.9 It seemed to me that entertainment
law is the place where capital exposes itself, which saved me the
difficult work of forcing it out, of making it visible in cultural artifacts.
In entertainment law, the economic motive is written all over the face
of things, as opposed to the way it appears in narrative fictions-in
disguised and inverted forms. This is not to say that legal doctrine is
not itself either disguised or inverted-only that it disguises different-
ly. Reading the face of capital is a significant exercise as we look back
over the great century of consumer culture, an epoch anticipated by
two ground-breaking turn-of-the century critiques: Georg Simmel's
The Philosophy of Money1° and Thorstein Veblen's The Theory of
the Leisure Class,11 two books to which I would like to return at the
end of the century because of their remarkable foresight. Providing
7. See ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 15-25, 56-57, 62-64 (Annette Lavers trans., 1972).
8. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
9. The cases that I studied spanned 43 years, starting with Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns
Publishing, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940), and ending with Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
10. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (David Frisby & Thomas B. Bottomore
trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978) (1907).
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premonitions of the midcentury critical developments that culminated
in the Frankfurt School, Simmel and Veblen wrote about consumer
culture when it was still strange, when, in Veblen's term, it could still
be understood as "conspicuous." At the end of the century, looking
back, we see in the developed West nothing but consumer
goods-everything is commodified, or, in the terminology of Georg
Lukdcs, Simmel's student, everything is reified.12 In a recent article,
Michael Denning, looking at this same development, noted the
absolute totality and omnipresence of the commodity, exclaiming:
"All culture is mass culture under capitalism" 13; "the fact is that mass
culture has won; there is nothing else."' 4 Reification, once a process
we hoped could be reversed, is complete. Acts of consumption may
be flamboyant, but they no longer stand out conspicuously. Rather,
they blend in with other highly visible acts of consumption.
It is all well and good to proclaim at the end of the great century
of consumer culture that everything is commodified and that nothing
has been left out. We sort of know this already, but when we see it in
print we think: "What is to be done?" There is in Denning's
statement a doomsdayism that makes us sit up and take notice. Yet
there is also a problem for those of us in cultural studies in declaring
the victory of mass culture, since cultural studies is premised on the
possibility of resistance (however slight) to this process of the
commodification of everything. 5 Consider something that may not
have occurred to you as yet. If mass culture has won, what are the
implications for cultural studies? Is the complete victory of mass
culture the end of cultural studies? The answer to this question is
"no," but only because cultural studies is premised on the existence
of resistance to coincident with the domination of capitalist consumer
culture. The theory has been that the more things are commodified,
the more resistance to the process is produced. The growth of mass
culture has meant that people in the Western world find it
increasingly difficult even to imagine goods and relations that are not
commodified, let alone to act to counter the process. In the light of
the "victory" of mass culture, we need to invigorate the cultural
studies methodology in two particular directions: first, by expanding
the definition of "resistance" to include more and more individual and
12. See GEORG LuKkcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (Rodney Livingstone trans.,
1971).
13. Michael Denning, The End of Mass Culture, INT'L LABOR & WORKING CLASS HIST.,
Spring 1990, at 4, 8.
14. Id.
15. For one of the best statements of the significance of the concept of resistance in cultural
studies, see Stuart Hall, Notes on Deconstructing "The Popular," in PEOPLE'S HISTORY AND
SOCIALIST THEORY 227 (Raphael Samuel ed., 1981).
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institutional developments; and second, by undertaking a more
systematic study of the stages in the process of commodification over
the last century.
In an effort to take up the second of these challenges and to look
at a crucial moment in the process of commodification, I decided to
center my study of entertainment law on the midcentury transfor-
mation of the right of privacy into the right of publicity. Fortunately,
I was able to pinpoint this transformation and isolate it in a single
case (which, by definition, is always a cumulation of case precedents).
Here, I located the moment where in Haelan Labs v. Topps Chewing
Gum,16 Judge Jerome Frank declared that baseball players had rights
of privacy that became the very publicity rights used to publicize their
images on baseball cards. This seemed totally absurd and absolutely
amazing: The same right that could shield or protect an individual
from the public eye could be turned inside out and used for purposes
of celebrity promotion-to produce the individual as a popular public
figure and, further, to produce that popular celebrity as a commodity.
Judge Frank, circumventing the question of the seeming impossibility
of transferring a personal right of privacy (the right to be let alone),
declared that he found in operation a "new right" that might be called
a "right of publicity." He acknowledged the capital investment in
career building, evidenced by the sports celebrities' practice of trading
on exclusive rights to their own names and likenesses, whether for
advertising endorsements or other commercial artwork.
In the words of Melville Nimmer, Haelan was one of a significant
line of cases that began to show that "publicity values [were]
emerging as a legally cognizable right protectable without resort to
the more traditional legal theories."17 Here, Nimmer's enthusiasm for
trends in the law that would favor growth in the entertainment
industry is barely concealed. The key question for me, however, is
always which came first-the right or the economic value of that right.
Historically, U.S. courts have equivocated in unfair competition
disputes, in an endless postponement of resolution: The law creates
the right, the right creates the value, the value creates the right, the
right preexists in the property, which is recognized by law, which is
none other than the right itself. The circularity of rights discourse can
verge on nonsense. One of the legal realists (whom I like to invoke
whenever possible) noticed the nonsensical nature of the circular
reasoning characterizing unfair competition law as early as the 1930s.
Felix Cohen remarked, "It purports to base legal protection upon
16. 202 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1953).
17. Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954).
1998]
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economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value
of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally
protected." 8 Suffice it to say that I was delighted to find such
contradictoriness in the law-delighted and horrified. The law
"purports" to exist in a realm above the economic, and here was
unfair competition law clearly evolving in such a way that it would be
able to produce economic value.
Also pertinent in my critical reading of entertainment law was the
way in which the subject, based on an idea of separate, individualized
personhood, could be so crucial in law, almost as though the culture's
privileging of the self (as in I, me, mine) had come to have a perfect
equivalent set in legal stone. It seemed as though this discovery of the
legal subject (the rights-bearing individual) at the core of copyright
and entertainment law doctrine was much more politically significant
than that other subject with which literary theory has been so
concerned-the transcendental subject who is so often said to
structure modes of viewing and to organize all of Western culture.
The property-owning subject is far more interesting to me than
poststructuralism's speaking-subject, and this, I think, is because of
the way the property-owning subject turns on itself.
Perhaps my interest is not in the legal subject per se, then, as much
as in its contradistinction-in the way that that subject is set up only
to be countermanded, and countermanded by itself. Capital borrows
the very entity (the person) that we think of as sacrosanct in order to
produce out of it something that turns against that entity (the person).
It borrows from us something that becomes quickly estranged from
us. And here is where I think Jamie Boyle and, more recently, John
Frow19 are right to stress the significance of Moore v. Regents of the
University of California,' the case in which Moore tried unsuc-
cessfully to regain the rights to his own cell line, which was finally
worth about three billion dollars.2' Moore failed to establish owner-
ship of his own human tissue because, although he had produced it,
he had not, as a subject, created anything new out of it. Although the
producer of his cell line, he was not the "author" of it. In order to
have made his tissue his own property, to establish his right to it, he
would have had to mix it with his personal labor. The University of
California medical research team had "worked" on his cell line, using
18. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 815 (1935).
19. See JOHN FROW, TIME AND COMMODITY CULTURE 154-62 (1997); James Boyle, A
Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 1413, 1508-20 (1992).
20. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
21. See id. at 489, 493.
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its human labor to "invent" or "reproduce" it, thereby becoming the
"authors" of Moore's cell line. Yet this case seems to fly in the face
of common sense. How can another entity exploit parts of the very
thing you thought you so indisputably owned-your own body?
It is interesting to move from Moore v. Regents of the University of
California back to a case like Gross v. Seligman.2 Gross's outcome
indicates not a move away from ownership of one's physical body, but
a move away from ownership of one's creative output in the face of
counterclaims based on commerce. Perhaps remembered best as the
"Grace of Youth" case, Gross involved a photographer-artist who
photographed a nude model, sold the photograph in one year, and
returned to the successful formula two years later, producing a
photograph exactly like the first but with a cherry stem held between
the model's teeth.23 The owner of the "Grace of Youth" photograph
successfully argued that the photographer had "copied" the first
photograph and therefore had infringed upon the owner's copyright.
The owner of the photograph argued that, rather than producing
something original, the photographer had merely copied the photo-
graph, the copyright in which was now owned by someone else. In
fact, however, the photographer had copied his own original concep-
tion. And it was the fact that he had put his own originality into the
work that had made it possible for him to sell the work in the first
place. Or, as the copyright premise goes, because of the existence of
the right by virtue of the existence of the personal subject, that right
can be transferred and ultimately taken away. In other words, the
author can lose his right because he has that right.
This problem in the evolution of copyright doctrine has a com-
panion problem in the cult of originality, the cult that promotes
reverence for an originary moment as well as the original object of
art, such as the signed painting, the first edition book, and the one-of-
a-kind artifact. Why, I would like to know, given the reproducibility
of culture at this time in history, do we continue to pay such
deference to this cult? To me, the challenge to copyright law mounted
by digital culture is not nearly as interesting as the way in which the
cult of the original has flourished in inverse relation to the scientific
developments that should signal its demise. Sotheby's recent auctions
of John F Kennedy's personal belongings for fabulous prices and the
fantastic financial success of Princess Diana's castoff dress auction
exemplify the survival of the cult of the one-of-a-kind, which exhibits
22. 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
23. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER
ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION-INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION,
AND PRIVACY 203-05 (3d ed. 1985).
1998]
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its manifestations in nostalgia culture as well as among fine art
collectors. The masterpiece enshrined in the museum still reigns, and
the spell of the work of art's "aura" has not been broken by
mechanical reproduction as Walter Benjamin hoped it would be.24
Rather, the principle of originality holds together the possibility of
multiplicity. Mass production (multiplicity) is guaranteed (as
profitable) by the singularity of the right to copy. As I have written
elsewhere in an article on Andy Warhol and the right of privacy:
"The formula for celebrity, after all, is that the fame of one depends
on the complete obscurity of others. The exclusive right requires their
exclusion."25
To restate a theme that runs through intellectual property doctrine
from the 1709 Statute of Anne (that milestone in Anglo-American
copyright law)26 to the phenomenon of Andy Warhol: Multiplicity is
guaranteed by singularity. And this is only one place in intellectual
property law where the contradictoriness of the law stands out in
relief. It has been this contradictoriness that I have found most
intriguing in my reading of entertainment law. I am totally fascinated
by the way in which the right to be left alone can do an about-face
and become the right to promote oneself in the public eye. Of course,
it is all about exclusion, or, as another legal realist, Morris Cohen,
argued in the 1920s, it is about enforcement: "A right is always
against one or more individuals. 2 7 It is about a negative right that
can be turned into a positive right as it turns into a property defense
and asserts ownership. The right-of-publicity doctrine still seems to be
historically contradictory and my first inclination is to say that the
case law here is contradictory because of an interesting clash of values
in the society at large. Here is where the values of an earlier society,
a society that was aristocratic and circumspect, comes into conflict
with the new commercial "tell all" and "show all" society, a clash
made manifest in so many right-of-privacy cases just after the turn of
the century. The contradictions are still there in the doubleness of the
society that wants its privacy as well as its publicity. Why did we
express outrage at the publication of the secretly secured photograph
of Brad Pitt's private parts as we rushed out to buy copies of the
tabloid that ran the photograph? Why were we angered at the
aggressive stalking by French paparazzi that contributed to the
24. See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry Zorn trans., 1973).
25. Jane Gaines, Reincarnation as the Ring on Liz Taylor's Finger: Andy Warhol and the
Right of Publicity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 131, 147 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1995).
26. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
27. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 12 (1927).
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accident that caused the death of Princess Diana at the same time that
we madly continued to collect candid photos of her? Why did
Caroline Bessette Kennedy spit in the face of photographers who
hounded her at the airport on the way to the funeral of Michael
Kennedy?28 Why did we applaud this at the same time that we
regretted that there was no image of it in the tabloids? The contradic-
tion that exists in the society between personhood that is thought to
be constituted as a private entity and personhood that is constituted
as public and commercial is written at another level and in other
terms in case law itself. The right of privacy is used to secure the right
of publicity. The one right is sacrificed to the other, and it is the
naked absurdity of this that attracts me to entertainment law and to
this thoroughgoing transformation of things not property into property
by means of a sacrosanct legal convention: the right to property in
ourselves.
In conclusion, I want to take this question of the right to property
in ourselves in a new direction. I want to suggest how the very
principle of property in the self that gives rise to such absurd
application has a flip side that is absolutely serious and deeply
significant. It was not, however, the serious application of the right to
property in oneself, but the apparent inconsistency of the application
that first attracted me to legal studies. This inconsistency attracts me
because I take the concept of contradiction very seriously, drawing it
from Marx who understood the dialectical contradiction of the
commodity form that expresses the difference between exchange value
and labor.29 On a larger scale, the concept of contradiction
encompasses the tensions between production and consumption,
capitalism and socialism, and labor and capital. And I have always
had a hunch that on some level, contradiction as evidence of the
duality of capital had the potential to stir the masses and awaken
slumbering political sensibility. (Or, to perform an automatic critique,
as the inconsistencies of capital were figured, its premises would be
undermined.) To support my hunch, I quote Louis Althusser, who in
his essay Contradiction and Overdetermination speaks of the
"simplicity of the Labor/Capital 'beautiful' contradiction [that] has
answered to certain subjective necessities of mobilization of
... masses."
30
28. See George Rush & Joanna Molloy, Upset Bessette Fights Photogs Spit for Tat, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 1998, at 14.
29. See, e.g., Jane Gaines, The Melos in Marxist Theory, in THE HIDDEN FOUNDATION: FILM
AND THE QUESTION OF CLASS 56 (David James & Rick Berg eds., 1995).
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Recently, I realized that one of the threads running through my
scholarly work has been this concern with the contradictions of
capital, which I have considered in relation to silent film melodrama,
and in particular to silent films produced by African Americans and
Euro-Americans for the all-black theatre circuit in the years before
1927.31 In fim melodrama, the contradictions of capital often take
the form of scenarios of extremity: inconsistent action; unjust rule;
and unfair treatment. The melos in the drama is often produced by
the one hand that doesn't know what the other is doing-whether it
is the hand of the state or the hand of the white patriarch. The state
says one thing and does another. In the "race" melodrama, the most
dramatic example of this is the appalling treatment of human beings
as though they were not human beings. Here, the melodrama arises
from the attempt to justify the unjustifiable, producing conditions that
could not hope to sustain themselves because of the contradiction in
their very premises: the confusion arising from the impossibility of
being legally neither human nor thing; the patriarchal laws of descent
contradicted by capital in the rule that children followed the status of
the mother; the contradictory evidence of "blood" that was both
visible and invisible in the mulatto; and, during and after Reconstruc-
tion, the contradictory hand that held out opportunity for all and
withdrew it for some.
The dilemma of the "race" melodrama in U.S. history is of course
a dilemma underwritten by the historical fact that the slave did not
have property in himself, and this, of course, is a branch of the
problem I set out to address at the beginning: the problem of
property in the self as it is modeled on property in the commodity.
Slavery as the extreme form of commodification of the person is not
difficult to grasp, particularly as we understand the extremes of
commodity culture. I need not dwell on the political and economic
equation that historically justified that "peculiar institution" as it is
now called. Instead, I want to look to the long, horrid history of the
commodification of human beings for another reason-to try to
understand the possibilities of "decommodification." Time and again
over the last two centuries, we have seen how, to quote John Frow,
"'The person' is at once the opposite of the commodity form and its
condition of existence."32 As is abundantly clear to me from my
study of Anglo-American copyright doctrine, the "person" historically
31. See JANE GAINES, OTHER/RACE/DESIRE: MIXED BLOOD RELATIONS IN EARLY CINEMA
(forthcoming 1999); Jane Gaines, Fire and Desire: Race, Melodrama, and Oscar Micheaux, in
BLACK AMERICAN CINEMA 49 (Manthia Diawara ed., 1993); Jane Gaines, Mixed-Blood
Marriage in Early Race Melodrama, in OSCAR MICHEAUX AND HIS CIRCLE (Jane Gaines et al.
eds., forthcoming 1999).
32. FROW, supra note 19, at 152.
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has been recruited to underwrite the commodity form even as he
stands antithetical to it. As the antithesis of commodification, it would
also seem that the real historical person is the first place to look for
the seeds of resistance to the virulent spread of capital. But when and
how, if ever, has "the person" as a construct or as an historical entity
ever successfully halted the process of commodification?
One might say that "the person" intervenes to stop the process with
every legal assertion of privacy rights, regardless of the outcome of
litigation. The case of Jackie Onassis is an example of a public figure
who entered into an action on the basis of the "theft" of aspects of
personhood, although as a rich and influential celebrity, she hardly
typifies the "resistance" we understand as located outside structures
of power. Another problem also arises when we look to case law for
signs of resistance, since it only gives evidence of skirmishes won and
lost and no sense of the battle. On another level, the legal victories
of persons against capital immediately can turn into new triumphs for
private property. Jackie Onassis's personal victory over the Dior
company that appropriated her image, for example, threatens to
remove her image from the public domain of history.
The number of times that case law has come down on the side of
commodification in the last century has not dissuaded me from
looking for signs of resistance to the inexorable movement of capital
into every corner of our lives. I continue to look for aberrations in
case law or for ignored or forgotten historical precedent. What has
come to my interest recently, however, is perhaps the most important
systematic reversal of commodification in the last two centuries, a
dramatic reversal because it was, in fact, a wholesale decom-
modification of the human being.33 And I refer here to the abolition
of slavery. It may seem a long distance between, on the one hand,
celebrity image litigation and, on the other, right of privacy disputes
and the systematic treatment of human beings as fungible property.
In fact, to mention the claims of the rich and famous in the same
context with the greatest human injustice in recent memory seems
politically insensitive. But the right to property in ourselves as a legal
defense stands at one end of a continuum, with the transfer of
property in ourselves and ultimately the loss of property in ourselves
in the middle. At the other end of the continuum stands "no right to
property in ourselves," which in its most extreme form is human
enslavement. The point is not to miss the legal premise that licensed
the slave trade and plantation economics, a premise that is one and
the same as the doctrine that guarantees new fortunes in celebrity
33. See id. at 135.
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